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In Clarke v. City of G'eer' demurrer was interposed to the
complaint on grounds of misjoinder and overruled by the
lower court. Two causes of action were separately stated, the
first against the municipality for actual damages for an al-
leged wrongful taking of plaintiff's property, and the second
against the contractor for an alleged trespass in constructing
sewer lines, for which actual and punitive damages were
sought. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that Section
10-7012 permits a plaintiff to unite in the same complaint sev-
eral causes of action when they arise out of the same trans-
actions but such causes must "affect all the parites to the ac-
tion." The Court concluded that there was no basis for a com-
mon or joint liability against the two defendants. The action
against the municipality was brought under the constitutional
provision based upon an alleged taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.3 That against the sec-
ond defendant was solely a common law action in tort for an
alleged willful trespass. Since punitive damages were not re-
coverable against the city, the joinder was held improper
under the authority of Piper v. American Fidelity & Casualty
Co.4
In Roper v. South Carolina Tax Commission5 the rule was
applied that in passing upon a demurrer the court is limited
to a consideration of the pleadings under attack, all of the
factual allegations properly pleaded being deemed admitted.
Suit was brought to recover the amount of tax paid under
protest, it being alleged that the plaintiff received a stock
dividend in the form of preferred stock in the corporation in
which plaintiff owned all of the shares of common stock. This
was not reported as income and the tax was later paid under
protest upon assessment by the Tax Commission. Demurrer
*Attorney at Law, Columbia, S. C.
1. 231 S. C. 327, 98 S. E. 2d 751 (1957).
2. CODE OF LAws'oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
3. S. C. CoNsT. Art. I § 17.
4. 157 S. C. 106, 154 S. E. 106 (1930).




Published by Scholar Commons, 1958
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
was interposed on the ground that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action for the reason that the stock dividend
which plaintiff admittedly received by way of preferred stock
constituted income under the state act. This view was upheld
by the Court and since the pertinent facts appeared on the
face of the complaint, the demurrer was sustained.
Taylor v. Wall6 clarifies the procedure to be followed where
defendant contends the action is brought in the wrong county.
Defendant, a resident of McCormick County, was sued in
Aiken County for breach of a contract for work on plaintiff's
lot in that county. He demurred on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of his person. The order of the lower court
overruling the demurrer was affirmed on appeal for the rea-
sons that the complaint contained no allegation as to residence
and the claimed jurisdictional defect did not appear on the
face thereof. The Court reiterated the often stated rule that
in passing upon demurrer, the court is limited to the allega-
tions of the complaint, which must be accepted as true, and
cannot consider facts not alleged therein. The opinion noted
that the question should properly have been raised by a motion
for change of venue, in which case the court would have
jurisdiction to transfer the cause to a proper county. A failure
to take proper steps to change the venue would constitute
a waiver of the jurisdictional objections.
In Clifton v. Darlington Finance Co.7 defendant attempted
to raise the issue of res judicata by demurrer to the complaint
and simultaneously moved to strike the complaint as "sham
and frivolous" by reason of a former judgment. The facts
pertaining to the former action which the defendant con-
tended barred the present action did not appear on the face
of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the demurrer
and motions were properly overruled, again noting that the
court is limited to the allegations of the complaint, which
must be accepted as true, and cannot accept facts not alleged.
The defense of res judicata, an affirmative defense, must be
pleaded, and since the facts did not appear on the face of the
complaint, it could not be raised by demurrer. Serious doubt
was expressed in the opinion as to whether a complaint could
be stricken as sham, but it was held in any event that the
defense of res judicata could norc be raised in this manner.
6. 231 S. C. 683, 100 S. E. 2d 400 (1957).
7. 231 S. C. 672, 100 S. E. 2d 404 (1957).
[Vol. 11
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 15
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/15
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
Wallace v. Timmons" raised interesting questions on de-
murrer in an action against an executrix for an accouning for
trust funds. The complaint alleged that the deceased was an
agent of an insolvent insurance company and at the time of his
death had funds in his possession belonging to the company.
Suit was commenced by the receiver more than seven years
after his death. The trial court sustained the demurrer on
three grounds, only two of which were considered by the
Supreme Court, to wit: (1) that the claim was barred by
Sections 19-473 and 19-474,9 providing for time in which
claims must be filed, and (2) that it was barred by laches in
view of the lapse of time. As to the first ground, the Supreme
Court held that the foregoing sections did not apply since they
have reference to claims of creditors and debts of the testator
payable from the estate. Since the complaint alleged a trust
relationship and that the monies constituted a trust fund, the
fund did not become a part of the estate.
Although not pleaded as a ground for demurrer, the Court
considered the subject of laches. Notwithstanding the long
delay in commencing the action, the Supreme Court held that
lapse of time is only one of the elements to be considered and
that consideration must be given to whether or not the delay
has caused prejudice to the defendant. The Court concluded
that this question should be determined at the trial and that
the trial court was not warranted in invoking the doctrine
of laches on its own motion.
In McClain v. Altman0 the defendants demurred to the com-
plaint in a libel action on grounds of insufficiency, contending
that they did not publish the libel and that it did not appear
that they were responsible for the publication. The order of
the trial judge overruling the demurrer was affirmed on ap-
peal. The Court held that for purposes of demurrer it is
axiomatic that all allegations of the complaint must be taken
as true. The allegations in the complaint that defendants com-
bined and conspired in printing or allowing to be printed the
alleged libelous placards, which could only have been intended
for publication, thereby contributing to the chain of circum-
stances culminating in the libel, were held sufficient to state
a cause of action.
8. 232 S. C. 311, 101 S. E. 2d 844 (1958).
9. CODE OF LAWS OF SoUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
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In Roberts v. Fore" the Supreme Court reiterated the estab-
lished rule that punitive damages are not recoverable for
breach of contract in the absence of proof that the breach was
accomplished with fraudulent intention and accompanied by
a fraudulent act. The action was based on the alleged refusal
of the defendant to enter into a contract with plaintiff for the
purchase of a lot of land, following defendant's offer to sell
by mail and subsequent arrangements by plaintiff to purchase.
In affirming the action of the lower court sustaining defend-
ant's demurrer, the Supreme Court held that the complaint
was lacking in the essential allegation that a fraudulent act
accompanied the alleged breach of contract.
Franks v. Anthony12 was an action for a partnership ac-
counting by one partner against another. Joined as parties
defendants were two persons who had established an escrow
fund out of which their indebtedness to the partnership was
to be paid and who were alleged to claim some interest in the
fund, the amount of which was unknown to the plaintiff, and
also the trustees in whose hands the funds had been placed.
Both the claimants and the trustees demurred on the grounds
of misjoinder, the former contending that no amount of in-
debtedness was alleged, nor any contract whereby indebtedness
resulted; the latter on the theory that they were not involved
in the accounting between the partners and had no dealings
with the partnership. The lower court sustained both de-
murrers but the Supreme Court reversed, reiterating that a
complaint is not demurrable if it contains allegations entitling
the plaintiff to any relief. With respect to the claimants
against the fund, the Court concluded that the allegations
that they had made a claim against the fund, that plaintiff
was without knowledge as to the amount, and that they should
be required to account therefor, were sufficient to withstand
attack by demurrer. The trustees were held to be proper
parties since the relief sought included instructions by the
court as to their duties with respect to the distribution of the
escrow fund. This conclusion was warranted from the allega-
tions of the complaint that the parties intended to place the
fund and the trustees under the equitable jurisdiction of the
court and that by accepting the fund they necessarily accepted
the conditions of the agreement.
11. 231 S. C. 311, 98 S. E. 2d 766 (1957).
12. 231 S. C. 191,97 S. E. 2d 891 (1957).
[Vol . 1I
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Motion to Strike
Crook v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.13 was an
action against the liability carrier to recover the amount of a
judgment obtained against the insured, who had died during
the pendency of the former action, for damages arising out
of an automobile collision. The insurer pleaded non-liability
by reason of certain policy violations by the decedent and
moved to require the administrator of the estate to be joined
as a party defendant so as to bind the estate for any judgment
obtained in the action. Upon plaintiff's motion the trial judge
ordered stricken the allegations of the answer as to policy vio-
lations as irrelevant, immaterial and redundant and refused to
require the administrator to be made a party to the action.
The Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that the allegations
ordered stricken had a substantial relation to the controversy
in that they put in issue the question of whether or not the
insured had violated the terms of the insurance contract. The
Court applied the rule that it is proper in an answer to allege
facts which constitute a defense to plaintiff's cause of action.
The action of the lower court in refusing to make the adminis-
trator a party defendant was affirmed, since the adminis-
trator was not a necessary party to the determination of the
insurer's liability under its policy contract.
Default Judgment
In Simons v. Flowers'- it was argued that the circuit judge
abused his discretion in refusing to open a judgment obtained
by default and to permit defendant to answer. In his affi-
davit defendant's attorney stated that he had placed a call
to plaintiff's counsel to request an extension of time but had
not completed the call and mistakenly assumed that such an
extension had been granted. His motion to reopen the judg-
ment was predicated on the fact that he himself had erred and
not his client. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dis-
cretionary power to permit an answer after default under the
statuter, is vested in the trial court and that the appellate
court is confined to correction of errors at law in such cases.
Such error exists only when the circuit court is controlled by
an error of law or where the order, based upon factual and
not legal considerations, is without adequate evidentiary sup-
13. 231 S. C. 257,98 S. E. 2d 427 (1957).
14. 231 S. C. 545, 99 S. E. 2d 391 (1957).
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port. Numerous authorities were cited to the effect that a
failure to answer due to counsel's own neglect or mistake is
not sufficient ground for reopening a default judgment and
the Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge.
Consolidation
In McKinney v. Greenville Ice & Fuel Co.16 the defendant
appealed from the order of the lower court denying its motion
to consolidate two actions for damages arising out of an auto-
mobile collision which had been brought against it. The two
actions arose from the same alleged tortious act and were
brought separately. In affirming, the Supreme Court held
that only where the parties are identical, and the causes of
action such as may have been united in the same complaint,
may the trial judge in his discretion order consolidation over
objection of either party. Where the parties are not the same,
several causes may, by consent, but not otherwise, be tried
together for convenience. The two actions were held to be
separate, not joint, and could not have been joined in the same
complaint under the applicable Code section. 17
Amendments
In Doss v. Douglass Construction Co.'8 separate actions
were brought by husband and wife for personal injuries aris-
ing out of a collision with a truck owned by defendant corpor-
ation, naming the corporation as the sole defendant. Prior to
the expiration of twenty days and before answer by de-
fendant, the summons and complaint were amended to include
the driver as a party defendant and the amended pleadings
were served upon both defendants. The corporation served
motions to dismiss the amended pleadings and both defendants
moved for a change of venue, which motions were denied by
the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that the
plaintiffs had a right to amend as a matter of course prior to
the expiration of time for answer and this extended to the
inclusion of a new party defendant.
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Joyce19 dealt
with the question of the propriety of the order of the lower
court in refusing to allow an amendment to the answer. The
16. 232 S. C. 257, 101 S. E. 2d 659 (1958).
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-701.
18. 232 S. C. 261, 101 S. E. 2d 661 (1958).
19. 231 S. C. 493, 99 S. E. 2d 187 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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action was brought under the Declaratory Judgment Actsa
to have the court construe an option and a deed whereby plain-
tiff acquired a strip of land for the construction of new tracks,
and to determine the rights of the parties with respect to the
old crossties. Defendant filed two counterclaims which were,
however, ordered stricken upon motion, without prejudice to
defendant's right to assert them after the court had construed
the instruments. When the case came on for trial, the de-
fendant moved to amend the answer on affidavit of counsel
that certain factual allegations in the counterclaims were
eliminated from the answer. The lower court refused to allow
the amendment for the reason that the allegations were largely
a restatement of the counterclaims which had been stricken.
This was affirmed on appeal, the Court noting that an allow-
ance of an amendment under the statute" is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge and no abuse thereof was
charged in defendant's exceptions. Two additional reasons
were given to support the Court's conclusion: (1) the pro-
posed amendments were substantially a restatement of the
counterclaims which had been stricken by order from which
no appeal was taken and which became the law of the case,
and (2) the amendment sought to review the negotiations be-
tween the parties prior to the signing of the option and deed,
which were inadmissable under the parol evidence rule.
The question of pleading decided in Simonds v. Simonds
2 i
related to the propriety of the refusal of the trial judge to
permit the defendant to file a supplemental answer to the
complaint. This action for divorce by a wife against husband
had twice previously been appealed to the Supreme Court and
had been remanded for the purpose of permitting the trial
court to pass upon whether or not the wife was entitled to
attorney's fees and separate maintenance. At the hearing the
husband attempted to file a supplemental answer and this was
refused for the reason that no new material facts had devel-
oped since the filing of the original answer. In affirming, the
Supreme Court noted that the denial of a motion to file a sup-
plemental answer is ordinarily within the discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed except for abuse of dis-
cretion or unless 'the action is controlled by an error of law.
19a. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-2001-10-2014.
20. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-692.




Published by Scholar Commons, 1958
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
Under the applicable Code section 22 such a pleading is in the
nature of an amendment and a motion to file the same will
not be granted unless it is in the interests of justice; likewise
the movant must make a showing of facts material to the
cause occurring since the former pleading. Since the facts
alleged in the proposed supplemental answer had previously
been encompassed in the original pleadings, the Supreme
Court held that the refusal to allow the amendment did not
deprive defendant of any substantial rights.
Concrete Mix, Inc. v. James23 was an action for goods sold
and delivered to the defendants, who, it was alleged, were
partners. One of the defendants defaulted and the other filed
a general denial by way of answer but did not deny the part-
nership specifically. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case
on trial, this defendant moved to amend his answer by deny-
ing the partnership but this was refused. In affirming, the
Supreme Court ruled that a specific denial of a partnership is
necessary to make an issue thereabout, a general denial not
being sufficient for this purpose. The Court held further that
it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny de-
fendant's motion to amend his answer by denying the partner-
ship since, if allowed, this would have substantially changed
the defense.
Bailes v. Southern Railway Co. 24 was an action for damages
arising out of the alleged wrongful death of decedent who was
killed when struck by defendant's train. One of the grounds
for appeal was that plaintiff had failed to allege that the
intestate was on the track as a licensee. During the trial of
the action, plaintiff proffered testimony to show that deceased
was a licensee and not a trespasser. This evidence was ex-
cluded on objection on the ground that plaintiff had failed to
so plead. Later on, however, the trial judge changed his ruling
and stated that plaintiff did not have to plead affirmatively
that deceased was a licensee, this being an issue for the jury
to determine from all the facts and circumstances. Plaintiff
was allowed an opportunity to offer additional testimony
along this line but did not do so. Without deciding the correct-
ness of the trial judge's ruling, the Court held that no preju-
dice could have resulted therefrom to appellant since no
further evidence was presented.
22. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-610.
23. 231 S. C. 416, 98 S. E. 2d 841 (1957).
24. 231 S. C. 474, 99 S. E. 2d 195 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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New Parties
Singleton v. Singleton25 was an action brought by one of the
heirs of the intestate against the administrator for an ac-
counting of all his acts and doings as such administrator. The
lower court granted the defendant's motion to bring in as
parties to this action the other heirs at law of the intestate
upon the ground that they were necessary to a complete de-
termination of the cause, and ordered plaintiff to amend the
summons and complaint and take necessary steps to bring
them in, either as parties plaintiff or defendant. The Supreme
Court affirmed under applicable Code sections 20 and held that
the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion properly joined
all of the heirs at law as parties, thereby preventing future
litigation and the necessity of a multiplicity of suits. Plaintiff
could not be prejudiced thereby since one decree could deter-
mine the rights of all interested parties. It was further
held that the trial judge could properly require the plaintiff to
take the necessary steps to make the heirs parties either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
Theory of Action
Barnwell Production Credit Ass'n v. Hartzog27 involved a
construction of the complaint to determine whether the action
was equitable or legal in nature. Suit was brought as the
result of defendant's alleged default in the payment of certain
promissory notes secured by real estate and chattel mortgages.
In his answer defendant pleaded fraud and deceit and inter-
posed a counterclaim based upon alleged false representations
of the plaintiff. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to
transfer the cause to Calendar 1 for trial by jury and granted
plaintiff's motion for a general order of reference, from which
an appeal was taken. In resolving the issue in favor of plain-
tiff, the Supreme Court applied the rule that a pleading is to
be construed liberally in favor of the pleader and that the
character of the action must be determined by the allegations
of the complaint. The Court concluded that the complaint,
taken as a whole, set forth a cause of action for foreclosure
of a chattel mortgage in equity and not an action in claim and
delivery. The issues raised by defendant's counterclaim could
also be tried on the equity side of the court and did not entitle
25. 232 S. C. 441, 102 S. E. 2d 747 (1958).
26. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-202, 203, 204, 219.
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defendant to trial by jury as a matter of right. The doctrine
of election of remedies was held inapplicable, since neither
party contended that the complaint sought inconsistent reme-
dies, the issue being rather one of construction.
Betterments
Reaves v. Stone28 involved the interesting question of allow-
ance for betterments where one is dispossessed of real estate.
It appeared that defendants' predecessor in title had pur-
chased at a tax sale lands which were owned by his brother
at the time of his death. The plaintiffs who sought possession
were some of the children of the deceased who had acquired
the interests of the other heirs. Defendants conceded the in-
validity of the tax sale and deed because of certain defects in
the proceedings and plaintiffs were held entitled to possession.
The trial court made an allowance to defendants for better-
ments but offset it by charging against them rental for the
use of the premises. Upon appeal defendants contended that
they were entitled to additional allowances for betterments
and that they should not have been charged with the rental.
In resolving this issue against their contention, the Court
cited the betterments statute, which provides that a person in
possession is entitled to betterments "if it be shown that the
defendant actually believed he was taking a good title in fee
simple thereto at the time of the alleged taking thereof.".2 9
This requirement not having been met in the pleadings or
proof, the Court concluded that the defendants were not en-
titled to betterments in any amount and that the rental was
properly charged against them.
On petition for rehearing defendants contended that their
rights were governed by Code section 65-2782 relating to a
dispossessed purchaser at a tax sale. Since the case had been
tried under the betterments statute, the Court would not con-
sider the new theory on appeal.
28. 231 S. C. 628, 99 S. E. 2d 729 (1957).
29. CODD op LAWS OF SoUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-407.
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